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Big data is in part responsible for a rejuvenated interest in the use of artificial intelligence for 
security applications such as predictive policing. Enthusiasts argue that using this data in concert 
with advances in computational machine learning will enhance the capacity to anticipate and pre-
empt problems of crime and security1. In response, critics either challenge the political feasibility of 
predictive machines, noting their unjustifiable intrusion into private communications or their self-
fulfilling prophesies, or they doubt the technical feasibility of training machines to learn the 
improvisation that is central to social relations such as crime and insecurity. Alternatively, sceptics 
are concerned with the powers and liabilities of hybrid human-machine learning in predicting 
security ‘scripts’. 
Enthusiasts 
The emergence of ‘social computing’ given the arrival of ‘read/write technologies’ (such as blogs, 
micro-blogs, social networking etc.) on the ‘interactive World Wide Web’ has provoked further 
interest in the prospect of integrating such user-generated data with digitally collected and archived 
administrative and commercial datasets to provide a ‘bird’s eye view’ of social relations. 
Computational scientists refer to this amalgamation of big data in terms of the ‘10,000 foot view’ of 
‘the social graph’ and argue that read/write technologies are just the beginning of an ‘age of social 
machines’2.  It is envisaged that these machines will rapidly evolve from a situation in which various 
read/write applications operate in isolation from one another (an exchange on Facebook, a 
discussion on Twitter, comments on a broadcast media website, opinions registered through on-line 
surveys, the retrieval and annotation of digitally archived police, health, education and census data 
and so forth) to one in which they interact with each other. In this way it is believed that social 
machines will enable an exponential increase in the kinds of artificial intelligence and collaborative 
work needed to grasp and solve the complexity of social problems that confront us and which are 
irremediable through individual thought and effort, from climate change through major public 
health challenges to mobilising local community responses to crime and violence.  
 
                                                          
1 Vlahos, J. (2012) ‘The Department of Pre-Crime’, Scientific American, 306/1: 1-9. 
2 Hendler, J. and Berners-Lee, T. (2010) ‘From the Semantic Web to social machines: A research challenge for 
AI on the World Wide Web’, Artificial Intelligence, 174: 156 – 161. 
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There is fertile speculation about the kinds of security scenarios that could unfold once such faith is 
placed in artificial intelligence. Enthusiasts for predictive policing (PREDPOL)3 in the United States 
and for ‘prospective crime mapping’ (PROMAP)4 in the United Kingdom have developed algorithms, 
premised on a ‘contagion thesis’, which seek to detect when and where crimes will occur by 
factoring in different kinds of assumptions about how crime spreads from an initial offence in 
particular environments given the routine activities and rational calculations of offenders, victims 
and control agents5. These predictions are then tested against the crime patterns actually registered 
through conventional methods of police recording and self-report studies of offending and 
victimisation and then the algorithms are subsequently revised as a means of better anticipating 
crimes and targeting pre-emptive interventions. The enthusiasm for building predictive machines is 
now being further extended to design algorithms or ‘machine classifiers’ to better ‘sense’ and 
anticipate patterns of threatening or ‘hateful’ on-line communications through social media and 
forecast their putative relationship to off-line events such as terror attacks6. 
 
Critics 
There are predictable criticisms of engineering predictive machines for security applications. In this 
context the most notable are those political concerns raised by the whistle-blower Edward Snowden 
about the massive and routine invasion of privacy through the US National Security Agency’s PRISM 
surveillance programme. PRISM collects communications through the internet, without reasonable 
suspicion, and then mines them for intelligence on, and forecasting about, various security threats 
including terror plots and illicit drugs markets7. The Snowden revelations suggest how an 
understanding of security premised on Big Data necessarily contravenes the right to private 
communications because the 10,000 foot view of the ‘security graph’ cannot be accomplished 
without generalised data collection from whole populations.  
 
A related concern is that predictive machines generate self-fulfilling prophesies. They  become active 
ingredients in the targeting of suspects such that problems of security become artefacts of the way 
the algorithms, machine classifiers and underlying assumptions of predictive machines, speculate 
about security to include certain concerns (e.g. speech about ‘radicalised’ Muslim youth) whilst 
obviating others (e.g. speech about the culpability of Western foreign policy in the Middle East). In 
this regard, targeting the usual suspects ceases to be just a consequence of episodic prejudicial 
police actions and becomes automatically reproduced by a social machine. The alienation of entire 
social groups as a consequence of this kind of group profiling and targeting, along with the creation 
of a policing environment conducive to miscarriages of justice is an established theme in critical 
criminology, particularly in the UK with reference to the war in Ireland and the long history of 
antagonism between the police and street populations, particularly of young males from minority 
                                                          
3Perry W.L., McInnis B., Price C.C., Smith S.C., Hollywood J.S., 2013, Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime 
Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations, Rand Corporation Report.  
4 Johnson S., Bowers K., Birks D., Pease K., (2009) ‘Predictive Mapping of Crime by ProMap: Accuracy, Units of 
Analysis, and the Environmental Backcloth’, in D. Weisburd (ed.), Putting Crime in its Place, New York, Springe. 
5 Benbouzid, B. (2015) ‘From situational crime prevention to predictive policing’, Champ pénal/Penal field, Vol. 
XII:  URL : http://champpenal.revues.org/9066; DOI : 10.4000/champpenal.9066. 
6 Burnap. P. and Williams, M.L. (2015) ‘Cyber Hate Speech on Twitter: An Application of Machine Classification 
and Statistical Modeling for Policy and Decision Making’, Policy and Internet, 7/2: 223-242. 
7 Lyon, D. (2014) ‘Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique’, Big Data and 
Society, July-December 2014: 1-13. 
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social groups8. However, the consequences of automating this policy failure are only just beginning 
to be appreciated9.  
 
Finally enthusiasm for predictive machines can be criticised on grounds of technical feasibility. It is 
argued there are only a few instances in which machines can be programmed to effectively mimic 
human actions, such as swinging golf clubs or dialling telephone numbers, whilst there are many of 
these actions that machines cannot accomplish and, crucially, will never be able to accomplish, 
because they require the fundamentally human capacity for improvisation, such as in writing love 
letters or subverting factory work regimes10.  From this perspective, the potential success or colossal 
failure of predictive policing hangs on the question of how improvised security problems are. It has 
been argued, for example, that improvisation is the central dynamic of much crime, particularly 
sophisticated organised crimes, in which perpetrators and preventers are in an ongoing 
correspondence, in this case an ‘arms race’ rather than an amorous exchange, to outflank and 
outwit each other11. In this scenario predictive machines will fail because they cannot adapt quickly 
enough to improvised real world social relations. 
 
Sceptics 
Sceptics of both the enthusiastic embrace and rejection of predictive machines argue that social 
relations may not be akin to swinging golf clubs but they may be sufficiently ‘scripted’ to be 
predicted, in part, by automated learning. Security problems may, to continue the analogy, be more 
like performances of a play in which the actors improvise around the script but still rehearse their 
lines and do not completely rewrite the story from one performance to another.  How these scripts 
and their narrative structures can be understood is the subject of current methodological argument 
and innovation in ‘digital social research’, in particular the prospects for hybrid human-machine 
learning in which algorithms driving the automated collation and analysis of big data are 
collaboratively designed and frequently refreshed 12.  
 
                                                          
8 Pantazis, C. and Pemberton, S. (2009) ‘From the “Old” to the “New” Suspect Community: Examining the 
Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorism Legislation’, British Journal of Criminology, 49: 646-666; Hallsworth, S. 
and Lea, J. (2011) ‘Reconstructing Leviathan: Emerging contours of the security state’, Theoretical Criminology, 
15/2: 141 – 157.  
9 Chan, J. and Bennett Moses, L. (2015) ‘Is Big Data challenging criminology?’, Theoretical Criminology, May 19, 
2015 1362480615586614. 
10 H. M. Collins and M. Kusch (1998) The Shape of Actions: What Humans and Machines Can Do, Cambridge 
MA, The MIT Press, p. 31. 
11 Ekblom, P. (2003) ‘Organised Crime and the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity Framework’, in A. Edwards 
and P. Gill (Eds.) Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on global security, London, Routledge; Dorn, N. 
(2003) ‘Protieform criminalities’ in A. Edwards and P. Gill (Eds.) Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on 
global security, London, Routledge.  
12 Edwards, A., Housley, W., Williams, M.L. et al (2013) ‘Digital Social Research, Social Media and the 
Sociological Imagination: Surrogacy, Augmentation and Re-orientation’, International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology, 16/3: 245-60; Housley, W, R Procter, Edwards, A., et al. (2014) ‘Big and broad social 
data and the sociological imagination: a collaborative response’, Big Data & Society April–June 2014: 1–15. 
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An example of a security script is Hope’s thesis on the ‘immunisation’ of non-victims of volume 
crimes, such as domestic burglary in England and Wales13.  In this script, non-victims immunise 
themselves through their access to private ‘club goods’ such as access to commercial household 
security, the market value of their homes as a proxy for the segregation of the residential population 
into wealthier neighbourhoods less susceptible to crime and through their participation in ‘gated 
communities’ with enhanced security surveillance and patrols. It is argued this immunisation 
explains the grossly unequal distribution of victimisation and non-victimisation for this problem in 
which four fifths of the residential population experience only one fifth of the burglary whilst 20 per 
cent of the population, with negligible access to these security club goods, are chronically victimised, 
experiencing  an estimated 80 per cent of the problem. There may be improvisation around this 
script, in that property crime is often further concentrated within particular households even within 
‘high crime’ neighbourhoods, but this is unlikely to result in any radical redistribution of household 
burglary by neighbourhood and therefore any refutation of the immunisation script.  This is an 
institutional question of the balance between public and private policing rather than a question of 
household dynamics. If this distribution of victims and non-victims is relatively stable, it ought, 
therefore, to be anticipated by a predictive machine driven by algorithms premised on Hope’s thesis. 
Whether more improvised security problems, such as urban riots, could ever be anticipated by 
predictive machines is a moot point but between the extremes of stable domestic burglary patterns 
and episodic civil unrest, there are other security problems whose scripted and predictable qualities 
are open to further research, debate and argument. An example of this is the use of artificial 
intelligence to indicate tension in social media communications14.   
 
Sceptics consequently offer an altogether messier and less certain reflection on the limits to hybrid 
human-machine learning but one that is irreducibly driven by humans in constituting problems of 
security not simply registering objective truths. There are also grounds for scepticism about the 
integration of variegated data sets composed of material collected over hugely varying temporal and 
spatial horizons. There may be opportunities for recomposing this data in ways that enable it to be 
meaningfully linked but even where relatively robust administrative data sets are concerned this 
entails a substantial input from human intelligence. Whether and how the lower fidelity data 
generated by users of social media can be meaningfully linked to other administrative and 
commercial data as well as the primary data sets produced by social scientists remains a very 
challenging, possibly insurmountable, methodological problem. Even if technically feasible, and this 
is a very big ‘if’, there are genuine ethical and political concerns about engineering predictive 
machines capable of collating person-specific data from multiple sources in order to circumvent 
controls on the anonymity of such data,  and thus the profiling and monitoring of ‘risky’ individuals 
and groups. This is particularly so where predictive machines could be deployed within any 
governing regime not just in liberal democracies with lively, open, debates about ‘snooper’s 
charters’ and Orwellian objections to Big Brother. At best we are in a situation that requires 
                                                          
13 Hope T. (2006) ‘Mass consumption, mass predation - private versus public action? The case of domestic 
burglary in England and Wales’, in Lévy R., Mucchielli L., Zaubermann R. (Eds.), Crime et insécurité : un demi-
siècle de bouleversements. Mélanges pour et avec Philippe Robert, Paris, L’Harmattan, 46-61. 
14 Williams, M.L., Edwards, A., Housley, W. et al (2013) ‘Policing Cyber-Neighbourhoods: Tension Monitoring 
and Social Media Networks’, Policing and Society, 23/4: 461 – 481; Burnap, P., Rana, O., Avis, N. et al (2015) 
‘Detecting Tension in On-line Communities with Computational Twitter Analysis’, Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change, 95: 96-108. 
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deliberation about the levels of confidence inspired by the technical feasibility of predictive 
machines and then about the appropriate regulatory frameworks for governing the access to and 
uses of such machines.  
 
